Prikazen na platnu by Cholodenko, Alan
79
* The University of Sydney
Theories of spectatorship and cinema are nothing new. In fact, they abound. 
On the other hand, theories of spectatorship and animation are still rare. Rarer 
still are theories that implicate animation and cinema, including in the area of 
spectatorship.1
For us, beyond as well as between theories of cinema spectatorship that attrib-
ute a pure passivity to the spectator and those that grant him a pure mastery, 
and beyond as well as between those that present themselves as purely text 
based and those that present themselves as purely context based, lies some-
thing, something missing from consideration that calls for acknowledgement, 
something integral to cinema spectatorship as it is to cinema “as such,” as it is 
to ¨lm spectatorship and to ¨lm “as such” – animation, ¨lm and media studies’ 
“blind spot.”
In accord with my larger project to bring to the fore the crucial nature of anima-
tion for the thinking of not only all forms but all aspects of cinema, of ¨lm, of 
¨lm “as such,” this paper seeks to elaborate a theory of spectatorship “proper 
to” animation, to ¨lm “as such” as a form of animation.
Not that I have not broached such a theory already.
This paper is ghosted, like all papers.
Ghosted especially by my “The Crypt, the Haunted House, of Cinema” (Cholo-
denko, 2004). At its end, I call for the rethinking of all  aspects of cinema as 
form of animation as form of the animatic through the spectre, through what I 
1 This paper was presented at the SCREENSCAPES PAST PRESENT FUTURE conference at 
The University of Sydney, 29 November-1 December, 2007. It was originally published in 
Animation Studies, 3 (2008).
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there elaborate as the Cryptic Complex, composed of the uncanny, the return of 
death as spectre, endless mourning and melancholia and cryptic incorporation. I 
propose that the elements of the Cryptic Complex oµer a way of conceptualizing 
¨lm rich in implication, including for the thinking of the sense(s) of cinema and 
for the rethinking of received theories of cinema, including those of ideology, 
the imaginary, fetishism, narrative, spectatorship, identi¨cation, etc. From this 
point of view, that of the necrospective, that of the vanishing point of view, every 
¨lm and every analysis is a tale from – and of – the crypt, making it necessary 
to conceive of cinema, of ¨lm, as  spectrography  (the writing of the spectre – 
ghost writing), as cryptography (the writing of the crypt), as thanatography (the 
writing of death). To conceive of spectatorship, as of analysis, as spectreship, 
as haunting and being haunted, as encrypting, as mourning and melancholia 
in perpetuity, no matter what other aµects might be generated to cover them 
over. From this point of view, there is always a spectre and a speculator in the 
spectator-analyst, always a corpse and a crypt. In fact, the spectres are always in 
the plural; and they are never laid to rest, never resolved, never reconciled. So, 
too, the analysis of the crypt, itself “the crypt of an analysis,” as Jacques Derrida 
declares (Derrida, 1986: p. xxiv).
Ghosted too by my more recent “(The) Death (of) the Animator, or: The Felicity 
of Felix” (Cholodenko, 2007),2 a text following on from “The Crypt, the Haunted 
House, of Cinema.” In this text I elaborate that spectre not simply as psyche but 
as psuché. Psuché is the Homeric simulacral ¨gure, the spectre, that leaves the 
body of the dead one to wander as °itting shade in Hades, which is, not insignif-
icantly for us, Maxim Gorky’s Kingdom of Shadows, his (for us) Kingdom of Cin-
ema, of Animation. No matter that Plato “turned” psuché the spectre into psyche 
the soul, he for us was never able to master the spectre – who could?! – a failure 
reanimated in every attempt by all his avatars to be master of the games played 
by the world and its objects, including master of cinema, of ¨lm animation – be 
it maker, analyst, theorist, spectator.
Plato’s reversal and ontologizing of the Homeric psuché as soul is inherited in 
the Latin anima (air, breath, soul, spirit, mind) and in the soul of Christianity. 
And in animation thought as ontological, that is, of the order of presence, es-
2 Part II of the paper is in Animation Studies, 2, 2007, on the Society for Animation Studies 
website. Part I joined it there in 2009.
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sence, the Platonic psyche, the Latin anima, the soul of Christianity. Which is to 
say that psuché, for me what Derrida calls the hauntological, spectres psyche, 
the ontological – pure soul, spirit, mind – as it does all rooted in psyche and 
the ontological, making them the special case, the reduced, conditional form, 
of psuché, of the hauntological.
Spectring the mind, psuché makes of thoughts ghosts.
And I would add: as “in-betweener,” to use a term of animation, psuché in like 
manner spectres the body and all associated with it, with materiality.
Lying at the “origin” of both cinema and mind, animation as psuché cryptically 
incorporates cinema in and as mind and mind in and as cinema, as psuché (and/
as animus) likewise lies at the “origin” of both cinema and body, of cinema in 
and as body and body in and as cinema. And psuché as knot, as we see in the 
hair of Madeleine/Judy and Carlotta Valdez in Vertigo – that spiral/twist called 
a “Psyche Knot” – inextricably knots (such) binary oppositions, creating knotty 
problems, problems incapable of resolution, de¨nitiveness, ¨nality, even as the 
always already doubled nature of the spectre makes de¨nition impossible, in-
cluding of animation “itself.”
Animation – as what we call the animatic  (the very singularity of animation, 
anterior and superior to animation, the condition of possibility and at the same 
time impossibility of animation, at once the inanimation in and of animation 
and animation in and of inanimation, that nonessence at once enabling and 
disenabling animation as essence, at once the life of death and death of life) – is 
of the order of the hauntological, of psuché, the Homeric eidolon – of at once this 
world and “an inaccessible elsewhere” (Vernant, 1991: p.187).
In “(The) Death (of) the Animator” I declare that cinema as form of animation as 
form of the animatic calls not simply for a psychoanalysis but a “psuché-anal-
ysis,” an analysis by de¨nition impossible of resolution, for psuché, even as it 
enables such a possibility, at the same time spells its death, as it does that of a 
science of the psyche, that is, psycho-logy, which would be an impossible sci-
ence of the double, of spectres, psuché  turning that “science” into a séance. I 
would add: even as it makes a science of cinema and of animation impossible. 
Such a “psuché-analysis” encrypts the analyst and spectator within it, at once 
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turning analyst into spectator and spectator into analyst, making it impossible to 
say which is which, commingling them inextricably, turning spectator and ana-
lyst into what they were never not – speculators, theorists (from the Greek theo-
ria, meaning a looking at, contemplation, speculation, from theoros, spectator).
Irretrievably speculative, not only ghosted by but ghosting them in turn, this 
paper draws forth from these texts and their calls, in this case to extend in par-
ticular the theory of spectatorship already broached in those texts, considering 
the spectator and the screen.
In so doing, it is immediately confronted with the question: is my call for 
a psuché-analysis of cinema, of ¨lm – of ¨lm as a form of animation – one not 
already responded to to a signi¨cant degree in the application to ¨lm since the 
1990s of Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytics of vision in the work of Joan Copjec, 
Slavoj Žižek and Todd McGowan – work serving as a corrective to the 1970s 
French and English Marxist ¨lm theorizations that brought Lacan’s article “The 
Mirror Phase as Formative of the Function of the I” to the theorizing of the cine-
matic apparatus (even while those theorisations at times misunderstood and 
misrepresented it)? Such theorisations were at best partial applications, ignor-
ing, or in the case of Christian Metz undervaluing, Lacan’s complex elaboration 
of the scopic ¨eld in his The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, an 
ignoring that included Lacan’s focus there on the term that became increasingly 
signi¨cant for him – the Real.
Here I turn to Holbein’s The Ambassadors.
Lacan makes it the centrepiece of his model of vision (Lacan, 1979: p. 91 and p. 
106), the overlapping triangles diagramming the irreducible split, the antino-
my, between the eye and the gaze of the irreconcilably split subject for him – 
the subject seeing the object as image and the object gazing at the subject 
as screen, turning the subject thereby into the object of the object, into, Lacan 
says, a “picture,” a “photo-graph” (Lacan, 1979: p. 106), that is, a drawing/writ-
ing with light3 – what is the determination of the subject in the ¨eld of the other 
3 On the relation of drawing and animation, see my “Who Framed Roger Rabbit, or the Fram-
ing of Animation,” “The Illusion of the Beginning: A Theory of Drawing and Animation,” 
“Still Photography?” and “The Animation of Cinema.”
FV_02_2016.indd   82 3. 01. 17   21:58
83
the spectre in the screen
by the gaze, which is objet petit a (in English little object a, a for autre, other) in 
the scopic ¨eld.
For Lacan, the scopic ¨eld is one where the subject seeing is always already 
given-to-be-seen by what is for Lacan privileged – the object – the object petit 
a, object-cause of desire. Its eµect is not only to keep desire desire by keeping 
it unful¨lled, but also to undermine the Imaginary illusion of the mastery of 
the subject over all he surveys, as well as to introduce constitutive lack into the 
¨eld of signi¨cation known as the Symbolic – objet petit a the void, emptiness, 
abyss, around which the symbolic order is structured (Žižek, 1989: p. 170). Ob-
ject petit a stands in for Lacan for and as the Real, his third term in the trio Im-
aginary, Symbolic and Real. The Real is what is excluded from reality, including 
the Imaginary and the Symbolic, for reality to be reality. It is a hole in reality, 
an ungraspable, undeterminable, non-signifying traumatic kernel of non-sense 
at the heart of reality, at the heart of the subject, at once their very condition of 
possibility and impossibility.
Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors
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Obviously, it cannot be totally excluded from reality, rather it is traced within it, 
it even erupts within it, even constitutively so, Joan Copjec tells us (Copjec, 2002: 
p. 184), which makes it for me like Derrida’s repressed but irrepressible trace of 
the radically other operating within, and at once enabling and disenabling, the 
structure of diµerence that is the sign. Indeed, Lacan declares that the trace of 
the Real as stain of the gaze is marked “at every stage of the constitution of the 
world, in the scopic ¨eld” (Lacan 1979, p. 74), as the trace is likewise for Derri-
da, who, calling the spectre “perhaps the hidden ¨gure of all ¨gures” (Derrida, 
1994: p. 120), turns the trace into a form of the spectre.
The Holbein, a vanitas painting, a memento mori (a reminder of death), exempli-
¨es Lacan’s animated, indeed animatic, modeling of vision. He declares:
… the secret of this picture is given at the moment when, moving slightly away, 
little by little, to the le², then turning around, we see what the magical °oating 
object signi¨es. It re°ects our own nothingness, in the ¨gure of the death’s head. 
It is a use, therefore, of the geometral dimension of vision in order to capture the 
subject, an obvious relation with desire which, nevertheless, remains enigmatic. 
(Lacan, 1979: p. 92)
Detail of Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors
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Lacan identi¨es the anamorphotic skull in the foreground as  la tache, which 
means stain, spot – a stain, spot, that is not only, he states, “the phallic symbol, 
the anamorphic ghost,” of the Symbolic but that which is superior to it, exem-
plifying the very function of vision as trap for the subject of desire: “the gaze 
as such, in its pulsatile, dazzling and spread out function” (Lacan, 1979: p. 89). 
What would be second spectre – Žižek calls it Lacan’s “fantasmatic spectre” 
(Žižek, 2005, 2006: p. 239) of the Real – that of objet petit a, the “primordially” 
lost object, seen only by looking awry, that oblique look marking the thing that 
forever eludes the grasp of the subject, that look that turns, that is, metamor-
phoses, anamorphoses – reanimates – the signi¨er of lack of the Symbolic or-
der into the lack of the signi¨er of the Real.
So Lacan had found the spectres traced in the Holbein long before I 
had,4 the psuché and the psuché of the psuché, the psuché “as such.” His psy-
choanalysis is psuché-“analysis.”
Now, another word Lacan uses for the stain, the spot, is the screen, stating: 
“…if I am anything in the picture, it is always in the form of the screen, which I 
earlier called the stain, the spot” (Lacan, 1979: p. 97).
So the stain, spot, spectre, is the screen, the screen of the gaze of objet petit a. 
It is the point of vanishing being of the subject. The dead point, the point where 
the picture “looks back,” telling the subject it is always already accounted for, 
inscribed within, enframed and determined by, it.
The screen is, we would say, the crypt of the subject, the place of cryptic in-
corporation, where the subject is encrypted as its own impossibility. It is the 
“place” where the subject is always already turned into a spectre, into spectres.
Indeed, one day, looking awry at the Oxford English Dictionary de¨nition of 
the word screen, I saw these words: “The form has probably been in°uenced by 
confusion with screne = SCRINE, chest, coµer.”
4 See “(The) Death (of) the Animator, or: The Felicity of Felix,” Part II: “A Di½culty in the 
Path of Animation Studies,” Animation Studies, 2 (2007), p. 10, note 3.
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A check then disclosed that the words chest, co§er, are etymologically and se-
mantically related to the word co½n!
The screen as co½n.
Crucially, Todd McGowan, treating of the Holbein, says, “Even when a man-
ifestation of the gaze does not make death evident directly like this, it none-
theless carries the association insofar as the gaze itself marks the point in the 
image at which the subject is completely subjected to it” (McGowan, 2007: p. 
7), to the gaze.
And the stain, spot, spectre, screen is scotoma, another term Lacan uses, which 
means a dimming of sight accompanied by dizziness, vertigo, and is term for 
the blind spot in our normal ¨eld of vision. For Lacan, the consciousness of 
the subject is scotoma, a blind spot blind to its lack of mastery, including of 
the visual ¨eld, dependent as that ¨eld is on the gaze, itself blind, indeed in-
diµerent to, but nonetheless animating of, the subject, the subject blind to the 
blind spot “as such” that is the objet petit a, blind to “that point of vanishing 
being” of itself (Lacan, 1979: p. 83), except when that spot is “looked at awry.” It 
is a spot that is at once traumatizing, wounding, pricking and eluding, a punc-
tum  (petite tache  for Roland Barthes, as Margaret Iversen tells us5) and dark-
ness that can never be brought to the light of understanding, of grasping, and 
that at once organizes and disorganizes the visual ¨eld.
In other words, the tache (spot) is blind spot (tache aveugle) is screen – at once 
barrier and passage, at once the barrier of the passage and the passage of the 
barrier – like Derrida’s notion of hymen.6 It is that entity that is at once unseen, 
5 Not only does Margaret Iversen point out how Roland Barthes’ thinking of the punctum 
takes up Lacan’s tache, Barthes even using the term petite tache to characterise punctum 
(Iversen, 1994: p. 457), she indicates the relevance to both Lacan’s and Barthes’ tache of 
Georges Bataille’s notion of  la tache aveugle, the blind spot (Iversen, 1994: p. 463, note 
29). See my treatment of Baudrillard’s photograph, Punto Final, in terms of the punctum 
in “Still Photography?”
6 As I treat of it in “Who Framed Roger Rabbit,…” Hymen is one of Derrida’s many undecid-
able, deconstructing ¨gures, in this case meaning both virgin and consummated, neither 
simply virgin nor simply consummated, at the same time (along with such likewise decon-
structed oppositions as confusion/distinction, identity/diµerence, veil/unveiling, inside/
outside, etc.) In that essay, I link the ¨gure of the hymen to that of the eye of the spectator, 
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in fact is never seen “as such,” but that allows one to see, is the very condition 
of possibility of “sight” – the blindness that make sight at once possible and 
impossible.7
The tache, stain, spot, blind spot, spectre, scotoma marks the point of the turn, 
where the image turns on itself, uncannily turning into screen, turning the sub-
ject from illusory mastery to nothingness, an eµect of not only metamorphosis 
but anamorphosis, not only an animation- but an animatic-eµect. Ana-, as in 
anamorphosis, meaning back, again, reminds us of the turn, the return, includ-
ing of death, including of Freud’s death drive, for which all uncanny returns are 
stand-ins, the return of death to the subject and the subject to it, which the sub-
ject had never le² nor death it. And of the phantasm, the spectre, of immortality 
beyond the cycle of life and death that the death drive urges upon the subject. 
It reminds us too of the deformation in every reformation, and vice versa, of the 
diµerence in every repetition, and vice versa, and of the destitution in every 
restitution, and vice versa. Mourning and melancholia are its aµects.
So the blind spot of the gaze, equivalent to the blind spot of the mind – the psy-
che – is for me psuché – the spectre not only in but as the screen and the screen 
not only in but as the spectre, the screen “as such,” the spectre “as such.” In 
spectring the subject, the gaze turns the subject into spectre(s).
Copjec writes: the ¨eld of vision is “haunted by what remains invisible in it, 
by the impossible to see” (Copjec, 2002: p. 94). This is the eµect on Lacan of 
the fantasmatic, that is, spectral, object he calls objet petit a, the object-cause 
of desire, the object that, like that famous °oating sardine can, “looks back” 
at him, an object therefore with a life of its own, lifedeath, animate(d) and an-
imating, indeed animatic, an object that not merely attracts but seduces him, 
as I discovered when I caught Alan Sheridan badly mistranslating seduces as 
attracts! (Lacan, 1979: p. 112).
to the self, to the cinema screen and to ¨lm “as such,” “the hymen of the eye/ ‘I’… dissem-
inating the unity of meaning, of presence and self-presence as identity” (p. 233), including 
the identity of ¨lm “as such,” not only penetrated but never penetrated at the same time.
7 Parenthetically, Derrida’s treatment of the parergon, the tain, the supplement, is relevant 
to the degree that the screen is and has been regarded as supporting act to the star, the 
image. The screen as repressed but irrepressible trace of the other would never not be 
returning to the image as what at once enables and disenables it.
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Here Lacan crosses paths with Jean Baudrillard, with whom he has in my ar-
ticulation already met, without my having the space to divulge it to you, but let 
us at least note their common assertion of the superior life of the object and its 
games over the subject and his desires, the quantum object even, “horizon of 
the subject’s disappearance” (Baudrillard, 2000: pp. 76-77), object which se-
duces the subject, plays with the subject, who for Lacan can return the favor 
and play with the object as a mask (to its mask, I would add), who for Baudril-
lard can return the challenge. And they seem to share the simulacrum hiding 
(the) nothing – the nothing which haunts reality – the question: why is there 
nothing rather than something?, and the secret.
Here let me simply propose: Lacan’s Real is to reality as Baudrillard’s Seduction 
is to his second order of simulacra, that of production and simulation, which 
order he too calls “reality,” making reality the special case, the reduced condi-
tional form, of both Lacan’s Real and Baudrillard’s Seduction.8 Which is to say 
that the objet petit a as gaze lures, seduces, the subject, leads it astray, annihi-
lates it and the putative mastery that the Imaginary, that production, reproduc-
tion and simulation, installed in the psyche.
I call objet petit a objet petit animatique, at once animating and deanimating 
reality and the subject.
I call it psuché.
The animating, indeed animatic, spectre of Death the animator, Death which, 
as formless form, as Lacan’s informe, gives all form, but is “itself” never given 
as such, just like Eisenstein’s plasmaticness, which for him is essence of ani-
mation and for me non-essence of animation as the animatic. Like the Thing in 
John Carpenter’s The Thing from Another World, which is for me the very ¨gure 
of Freud’s death drive as “organic elasticity” of protozoa (Freud, 1984: p. 309).
8 And as Derrida’s di§érance is to presence, making presence the special case, the reduced 
conditional form, of di§érance.  I must note here:  the thinkers whose work I privilege, 
Baudrillard, Derrida, Lacan et al., are not only thinkers of animation and the animatic but 
animatic thinkers of it. Please consult my Introduction to The Illusion of Life 2: More Essays 
on Animation for an elaboration of this point.
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Indeed, insofar as Lacan’s  tuché, “the encounter with the real”  (Lacan, 1979: 
p. 53), is for me an animating  encounter with his amoeba-like, for me plas-
matic, lamella (Lacan, 1979: pp. 197-199), it is an encounter with the Thing in 
the Carpenter ¨lm. Žižek in fact links the alien Thing in the Carpenter ¨lm to 
Lacan’s lamella, marking its uncanny, morphing, in¨nitely plastic, simulacral, 
undead nature, declaring “the alien is libido as pure life, indestructible and 
immortal” (Žižek, 2006: p. 63), and describing it as standing “for the Real in its 
most terrifying imaginary dimension, as the primordial abyss that swallows 
everything, dissolving all identities…” (Žižek, 2006: p. 64). An encounter with 
Lacan’s lamella, with his Thing, is therefore for me an encounter with psuché, 
the animatic.
The Thing’s capacity to seduce by simulating, making whatever it simulates 
enter its realm of metamorphosis, even despite itself, turning it from its destina-
tion to its destiny, cannot but recall for me the way in which Baudrillard turns 
Freud’s death drive on Freud, making Freud enter Baudrillard’s realm of meta-
morphosis, turning death into reversion, reversal, the very turn of Seduction, 
the turn that for Baudrillard  is Seduction – the reversibility of anything and 
everything – and into challenge. In such a light, psuché, the animatic,  is not 
only fatal to reconciliation “as such,” it is never not fatal to itself.
But here we must ask: Is all this not Maxim Gorky’s experience of cinema as 
form of animation as form of the animatic as he relates it in his for me account 
of the unaccountable, of what will not, can never, compute? And as I treat of it 
in “The Crypt, the Haunted House, of Cinema” and “(The) Death (of) the Ani-
mator…”?
Can we not read Gorky’s response through Lacan, through his seductive, ani-
matic model of vision as he exempli¨es it with Holbein’s The Ambassadors and 
as we have elaborated it? In Lacanian terms, would it not be fair to say that 
Gorky was traumatized, wounded, by his encounter with the gaze as objet petit 
a? Gorky “saw” the stain, the spot, the scotoma, the blind spot – the screen 
as apparition, his own apparition as spectre – and the blind spot of the blind 
spot – death, his own death, his own lifedeath, his condition as “undead,” (his) 
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reality put on the spot by the Real, by psuché, the spectre that screens – that 
is, at once installs, “reveals,” conceals (re-veils), and retracts – (the) nothing.9
In fact, Gorky’s description of his experience of cinema makes of the image as 
well as what it images spectres, to which he adds more spectres with his famous 
declaration: “Suddenly a strange °icker passes through the screen and the pic-
ture stirs to life,” metamorphosing from still photographic image to mobile cin-
ematographic image, passing from virtual animation to actual animation.
He saw the spectre that is this uncannily animating °icker stirring the image 
and what it images to life, turning still image into mobile image, and turning 
that mobile image (back) on itself, turning image into screen, at once drawing 
that “life,” or rather lifedeath, forward and withdrawing it, indeed drawing 
it forward in withdrawing it and withdrawing it in drawing it forward at the 
same time.
And he adds another spectre yet: the spectator. Cinema spectres the spectator 
even as the spectator spectres it, each having the other as its spectre, its haunt-
ed house, its corpse and its crypt.
And more yet: the maker and the analyst-theorist.
And all are in the plural.
These spectres, screens, haunted houses and crypts not only multiply but con-
catenate, at once spectring, screening, housing and encrypting and in turn be-
ing spectred, screened, housed and encrypted in and by each other.
The Cryptic Complex.
Animation as the animatic turns the spectator into what it always already was, 
a spectre, a spectre of the other, ghosted by and ghosting it, including ghosted 
by and ghosting the cinema and the cinematic apparatus, its characters and its 
author/maker, even as the cinema and its apparatus are ghosted by animation 
and its apparatus, as all these are ghosted by and ghosting the animatic appa-
9 I would add: Gorky experienced Barthes’ punctum, he experienced Bataille’s blind spot.
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ratus. As well, the animatic (and its apparatus) ghosts all models theorizing 
the spectator as simply a fully living human being (as form of presence, soul, 
spirit), including those models ¨guring that spectator as either merely passive 
or merely active.
The “life” of cinema, of ¨lm, as form of animation is psuché, the animatic, life-
death, making the subject’s sight and the image the special case, the reduced 
conditional form, of the gaze and the screen, making the subject the special 
case, the reduced conditional form, of the object, objet petit a, making life for 
me, as Nietzsche put it, the special case of death.
As for the hyperreality, the virtual reality, of today’s world, let me repeat this 
thought of Baudrillard, a thought marking the passage from  the mirror stage 
of “reality,” where the self was accompanied by a shadow which paradoxical-
ly made the self a self, a self as constitutively always divided from itself, always 
spectred by its shadow even as it spectred its shadow,  to  the screen stage of 
hyperreality, the stage of the clone, the revenge of the mirror people who break 
the mirror and enter into “reality.”
As Baudrillard says, “He who has no shadow is merely the shadow of himself” 
(Baudrillard, 2004: p. 103).
Or as we would say: “He who has no psuché is merely the psuché of ‘himself’.”
The crypt of “him”-“self.”
“His” “own” co½n.
“His” “own” Kingdom of Shadows, not the old Hades, the old spectre, of the Oth-
er but the Hell, the spectre, of the Same.
“He” is the man of but screens.
He is only screen.
He is Total Screen.
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Denis Nedry of Jurassic Park, not only surrounded by but surrounding and in-
distinguishable from screens.
He is Baudrillard’s Telematic Man, his Tele-Computer Man.
And he is Paul Virilio’s Man of the Three Bombs (atomic bomb, cyber/informa-
tion bomb and genetic bomb), a²er Einstein, and as well ¨gure of Virilio’s To-
tal Accident of science (Virilio and Lotringer, 2002: pp. 135-137, 142, 153-155), as 
testi¨ed to by Nedry’s computer, with the fascinating images attached to it – a 
photo of J. Robert Oppenheimer, “father” of the atomic bomb, with two papers 
stuck on top of it: a drawing with a mushroom-shaped cloud of the atomic bomb 
imaged within and doubling a thought balloon; and the words “Beginning of 
Baby Boom” on the paper next to it.10
He is Baudrillard’s and Virilio’s Man the extension, the prosthesis, of his ma-
chines, his vision machines, as exempli¨ed by Deckard, with his Voight-Kamp-
µ machine, testing Rachael, in Blade Runner.
He is Terminal Man, too, exempli¨ed by Miles Dyson of the Cyberdyne Corpora-
tion and Major General Robert Brewster, USAF, who arguably have put Skynet 
online…as “them”-“selves.” “They” are “it” and “it” is “they.”
He that is all these Men is for me avatar of that shadow, that crypt of “him”-
“self,” that is Dr Strangelove.
He is hyperanimated, hyperanimatic, hyperlifedeath: at once a life more death 
than death, more dead than dead, and a death more life than life, more alive 
than alive.
He is Baudrillard’s ecstatic, Lacan’s Real, in their metastatic, viral, fractal, 
clonal expression: hyper-psuché, ¨gured for me most compellingly in the skull 
of the Terminator.
He is hyperspectre.
10 On those attachments to Nedry’s computer, see my “The Nutty Universe of Animation, the 
‘Discipline’ of All ‘Disciplines’, And That’s Not All, Folks!.”
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The Death of Death.
The end… of the end…
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